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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Costa Rica	REPORT NO.	25X1A
SUBJECT	Communist Party Activities	DATE DISTR.	7 August 1953
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		REFERENCES	

25X1X                   THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
                           THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
                           (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

1. Deputy Manuel RODRIGUEZ Garacas approached Vanguardia Popular (VP, Communist Party of Costa Rica) leaders during the morning of 14 July 1953, with the plea that the PPI supporters attending the Congressional session deliberating on the legality of the PPI be instructed to avoid insulting and scandalous conduct. He stressed the need to avoid violence, which would only hurt the PPI chances of approval.
2. Considerable pressure was exerted by the supporters of Jose FIGUERES in Congress, with the result that Deputy Jorge MANDAS Chacon changed his vote to oppose PPI legality.
3. After the Congressional vote of 31-14 on 14 July, declaring the PPI illegal, Mario SOLIS, secretary of finance of the PPI, estimated that the defeat meant a loss to the Communists of over 100,000 colones, about half of which represented current indebtedness of the Communist Party.<sup>1</sup>
4. Soon after Francisco MONTERO, a Costa Rican living in Guatemala, arrived in Costa Rica with an urgent message for Manuel MORA to proceed immediately to Guatemala,<sup>2</sup> MORA was reportedly planning to go to Mexico after visiting Guatemala.<sup>3</sup>
5. There is no Communist Plan for violence in any form in connection with the presidential elections of 26 July, and no arms or explosives have been obtained or stored by the Communists. The Communist Party line of action to be decided upon at the 15 July session of the Political Committee of the Vanguardia was expected to result in support of the Partido Democrita of Fernando CASTRO Cervantes at the polls, but there were no further commitments.<sup>4</sup>

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1. See [redacted]

2. [redacted]

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Comments.

3. In connection with the recent trip of Gonzalo FACIO, close friend of Jose FIGUERES, to Guatemala, it was reported that FACIO was not very successful with ARBENZ but is believed to have made agreements with other unidentified groups in Guatemala. The Guatemalan Communist leader, Jose Manuel FORTUNY, may wish to discuss this matter with MORA.
4. It is just a matter of time before fighting breaks out between the Castrista and Figuerista forces, since the government will find it difficult to control the situation throughout the post-election period up to the inauguration date of 8 November 1953.

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